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There are different ways of theorising dyslexia and different ways of constructing 
meanings around dyslexia in different learning contexts. This paper considers the 
role of neoliberalist ideology in shaping conversations about dyslexia and 
‘fairness’ during two focus group conversations analysed as part of a study into 
the discursive construction of dyslexia in higher education. Ideological analysis 
was undertaken with reference to Gee’s discourse analysis and Willig’s concept   
of the use of discursive resources in interaction. Investigation identiﬁed 
neoliberalist ideology as a powerful voice within the analysed texts, and as 
directive for identity and action. This paper argues that recognition of the ways   
in which neoliberalist ideology shapes everyday conversation about learning and 
learning differences is vital in the construction and maintenance of fairer higher 
education in the UK. 
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Introduction 
Dyslexia is recognised in the UK to be a speciﬁc learning difﬁculty characterised by 
what are often termed as cognitive or neurological deﬁcits which impact upon  
reading ability (Nicolson and Fawcett 2008). However, there is  much  argument 
about how dyslexia is deﬁned, where it comes from, and how it is identiﬁed (Ho 
2004; Stanovich 2005; Elliott and Grigorenko 2014). Cognitive psychology dominates 
in the ﬁeld of dyslexia, and it is experts from this ﬁeld who thus help to shape the prac- 
tice of dyslexia assessment and support within the British education system. Powerful 
organisations (such as Dyslexia Action) and lobby groups (such as those afﬁliated to the 
British Dyslexia Association [BDA]) also inﬂuence the direction of practice (see e.g. 
the ‘BDA Quality Mark’ conferred by the BDA to organisations which meet its stan- 
dards for specialist provision: BDA 2015). Varying media representations of dyslexia 
also contribute to the controversy surrounding the label (see e.g. Hitchens 2014). One 
result of the many popular competing conceptions of dyslexia, the multiple interest 
groups, and the shifting diagnostic goalposts is that the term ‘dyslexia’ has become 
con- notatively loaded and confusing. 
Elliott and Grigorenko (2014) make a strong case for a move away from the use of 
the  term  dyslexia  as  a  scientiﬁc  and  educational  category,  especially  in  higher 
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education, and they suggest that provision of specialist support solely for the sub-group 
of poor-readers labelled dyslexic is unjustiﬁed. However, this paper argues that, while 
they contribute greatly to the conversation, cognitive psychologists such as Elliott and 
Grigorenko have insufﬁciently attended to the experiences of dyslexic people and the 
ways in which different learning contexts and discourses shape the ways dyslexia is 
understood and managed (Riddick 2010; see Pollak 2005 for a detailed exploration  
of the different identities dyslexic students can take on). There is also, arguably, a ten- 
dency for psychological science to forget that its measurements and conclusions are the 
product of social processes and are therefore not a neutral route to the discovery of 
‘facts’ (Latour 1987). This is not a criticism: it is a reminder. It is argued here that 
such scientiﬁc study should be considered alongside attention to the socially situated 
aspects of learning and learning difﬁculty, to the discursive construction of learning 
differences and disabilities in context, and to the people whom have been labelled in 
whatever domain as outside a norm. 
There is a conception among some parents, educators, dyslexic people and other 
members of the public that dyslexia is a myth and that the speciﬁc literacy difﬁculties 
associated with dyslexia are instead a result of laziness or stupidity (Riddick 1995; McDer- 
mott, Goldman, and Varenne 2006). This is arguably a misconstrual of scientiﬁc research 
which questions the existence of dyslexia as a speciﬁc sub-group rather than questioning 
the existence of people who struggle in speciﬁc cognitive or behavioural domains. Along- 
side the perception that dyslexia is a myth is the feeling that a dyslexic student is somehow 
cheating by getting extra help that other students do not get. If the student feels that she or 
he may be cheating in the name of a mythical condition, there is some evidence that this 
student will be less likely to make use of accommodations offered in an educational insti- 
tution (Marshall 2001; May 2001; Ferri et al. 2005; Denhart 2008). Whether or not the pro- 
vision of accommodations is fair or not is not the subject of this paper; rather, the point 
being made here is that such perceptions and behaviours are in part driven by discourses 
which draw heavily upon neoliberalist ideology (see below). 
 
Neoliberalism,  education and dyslexia 
Neoliberalist ideology is understood here as a web of discursive and material practices 
which upholds the idea of the market and the individual as the ideal starting point for 
shaping the social and institutional worlds in which we live, and which presents com- 
petition and deregulation as necessities for freedom and progress. But beyond this, its 
twin ideals of ‘privatisation and personal responsibility’ (Duggan 2003, 12) are 
deﬁned in such a way as to give the outward impression of cultural neutrality, ‘a way 
of being reasonable’ (Duggan 2003, 10) that manages to shift concerns about 
inequality into the ‘private’ domain (Duggan 2003, 14). In other words, one’s 
difﬁculties and personal challenges become one’s own business, and one should not 
make a  fuss  about them in order to be given (according to neoliberalism) an unfair 
advantage. Dyslexia,  under such a discursive regime, becomes the individual’s 
problem, not the problem  of the state (or the educational institution). Furthermore, 
efforts to address the disadvan- taging of groups of people with learning differences by 
promoting respect for neurodi- versity are diminished by the neoliberalism which 
works to both ‘subordinate and commodify difference’ (Runswick-Cole 2014, 1118). 
Universities are increasingly becoming a force for individualism (Williams 2014). 
The discourse has shifted from a recognition of universities as beneﬁcial to all in 
society,  to  an  emphasis upon  individual gain by  those who  attend, and  individual 
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responsibility for success. Moreover, universities are increasingly under pressure place 
economic growth and employability as central concerns and to shrink the attention they 
give to any practices which are not market driven (Johnson 2008). The traditional (and 
non-market driven) role of the university as a critical voice of government and society is 
then diminished (Williams 2014). There has also been a subsequent shift in perceptions 
in what is valuable in a student’s university education from knowledge and learning 
in and of itself, to those aspects of what students appear to be doing which increases 
mar- ketability (Ainley and Weyers 2008). 
One of the outcomes of talking about learning, disability and education without 
recognising or challenging neoliberalist discourse is that getting on alone in any   
walk of life is usually presented as a good and admirable achievement. In other 
words, neoliberalist discourse promotes the American ideal of the individual who suc- 
ceeds with sheer effort and determination and does not ask for help (Dudley-Marling 
2004, 483). Promotion of this idea to those in education may mean that a student   
will not ask for help, for fear this will be perceived as weakness (Dudley-Marling 
2004). This survivor rhetoric can also lead to oversimpliﬁcation and imbalance, by 
only promoting those stories where people have overcome a particular set of odds 
(Ferri et al. 2005). For those who are unable to overcome such odds there is the like- 
lihood of self-blame. 
 
The  dyslexia label 
The labelling of educational difference is fraught with difﬁculties, and this is no less the 
case for dyslexia (Ho 2004). Elliot and Grigorenko (2014) argue that disagreements 
about where the cut-off point should be in identifying dyslexia reﬂect their understand- 
ing that there is no distinct group to whom the label should be applied. However, that 
decisions about cut-off points can be problematic does not mean the label is without 
value. It is likewise not the categorisation itself which is to blame for unequal provision 
of resources: this is instead an allocation problem (Riddick 2010). Dyslexia is not, and 
cannot be, a socially neutral label; its meaning is bound to political, educational, and 
social contexts, and to individual experiences. From this perspective, a neat, static deﬁ- 
nition of dyslexia would not be the ultimate goal; the emphasis would instead be placed 
on understanding the role of context and history in helping to create the shifting con- 
struct of dyslexia (Danermark 2002). 
The category ‘dyslexia’ may be seen in part as a product of capitalism, 
‘concerned with distilling worth from bodies previously understood to be worthless’ 
(Campbell 2013, 213). The ‘worth’ of people in formal education is arguably closely 
tied to   their performance of particular literacy practices. It is not the cognitive 
difference which produces the disability, therefore, but the centrality of high literacy 
to con- ceptions of individual worth: ‘we should not let “dyslexia” disguise or cloak 
Lexism, which is the real issue’ (Collinson 2012, 69). Being proﬁcient at reading and 
writing is of such cultural value that it is hard to ‘make positive sense’ of difﬁculties 
in     these domains (Gwernen-Jones 2012, 16). Moreover, we should not 
underestimate  the discursive connections between literacy practices and conceptions 
of academic ability, which make it difﬁcult for individual learners to resist ‘the rules 
of the game’ (Collinson and Penketh 2009, 15; see Macdonald 2009 for a similar 
perspective). 
Attention to experiences of dyslexia is also one way of engaging with the anti-lab- 
elling movement present in some of the literature in the ﬁeld (Macdonald 2010). It is by 
listening to people’s experiences we might better understand the uses of the label in 
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everyday contexts. It is also important to recognise that the genuine attempts by cog- 
nitive scientists such as Elliott and Grigorenko to reveal the contradictions and potential 
misuses of ‘dyslexia’ as a diagnostic category are potentially being hijacked in the 
neo- liberalist cause, consciously or unwittingly. Much of the power of neoliberalism 
here lies in its appearance as common sense, and in the familiarity of its language: 
‘neoliber- alism gets into our minds and our souls, into the ways in which we think 
about what we do, and into our social relations with others …’  (Ball 2012, 18). The 
aim in this paper is to offer some insight into the ways in which talk about and around 
dyslexia, by dyslexic students, is moulded through ideological push and pull: with 
particular attention to the work of neoliberalist discourse. 
 
Methodology 
In concurrence with Billig (2001) the aim in this research ‘is to see how the themes 
of ideology are instantiated in ordinary talk, and how speakers are part of, and are 
conti- nuing, the ideological history of the discourse themes they are using’ (218). The 
current research uses a relatively loose understanding of ideology as belief systems 
(after Van Dijk 2006) expressed through discourses; or, after Giroux (1997), as a 
‘weight’ in dis- courses that may not be immediately obvious. Ideology can also shape 
sets of beliefs or values which are eventually understood as common sense, and, write 
Carr and Hartnett, ‘what is distinctive about common sense is that it is an inherited 
way of thinking … inevitably impregnated with the myths, superstitions and 
prejudices of the  past’ (1996, 3). By the time the ideas have become ‘common  
sense’ their  ideological nature is obscured. This need not mean the common sense 
view is ‘wrong’ or negative, but that it no longer has questions asked of it; it is this 
understanding of ideological common sense that is used in the current paper. 
The researcher organised two focus group conversations, one with six participants 
and one with seven participants, which were audio recorded and transcribed. The par- 
ticipants were all dyslexic students studying at a single higher education institution. The 
focus group conversations were stimulated through use of broad and open questions 
around the topic of dyslexia and study at university. The researcher allowed the conver- 
sation to develop in a participant-led direction after these open questions had been 
asked, though new topics were introduced once a particular discussion appeared to 
have come to a natural end. The transcripts were analysed using the guidance of Gee 
(2005, 2009) and Willig (2008) to identify (from an interpretivist perspective) the 
ways in which the participants made use of ideologically laden discourse in their con- 
structions of dyslexia. The feelings and perspectives shared by participants were con- 
sidered to be a partial product of the particular conversational context, and 
fundamentally tied to the language used; certain perspectives and feelings may have 
been difﬁcult to construct because of the particular social peculiarities of conversing 
with others (including myself as a researcher) in the given environment. As such, it 
was understood that some perspectives and experiences may have been avoided. 
This approach is in keeping with a critical realist perspective (after Bhaskar 1998). 
As such, it is considered that feelings and emotions are primarily socially and discur- 
sively produced, yet are not separable from the humans who experience them; or, as 
Harré puts it, an emotion is an ‘interplay between social conventions, moral 
judgements and bodily reactions’ (1991, 143). Emotions may be understood as ‘quasi 
objects’ (after Latour 1991); ‘much more social, much more fabricated, much more 
collective than the “hard” parts of  nature’ (55). Recognising feelings or  emotions as 
‘collective  activity’ 
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(Billig 2001, 213) arguably makes it easier to identify the ways in which some feelings 
or emotions can be ‘put to work’ for political ends (Williams 2001, 11) and can 
strengthen dominant ideologies. 
The analytical approach considered narratives, social context and linguistics as impor- 
tant analytical aspects (after Gee 2005; Willig 2008). It also considered that institutions 
and other aspects of social life have a material existence as well as a discursive one. This 
is again in keeping with critical realism in the recognition that sociological study is con- 
cerned with a different ontological level of reality from biological study and requires a 
different methodological approach (Danermark 2002). This does not mean that the bio- 
logical and psychological are not important elements in the experience of dyslexia, but 
that these are not the most useful starting points for the present investigation. It does 
mean that the social model of disability may not alone be sufﬁcient as a philosophical 
basis for understanding disability; recognition of the material and of individual experi- 
ences is also essential (Riddick 2001; Gwernen-Jones 2012). Gee’s (2005) approach to 
discourse analysis takes a balanced look at socio-historical factors, personal narrative, 
social languages, linguistics and local contexts. Gee recognises that people have differ- 
entiated access to different kinds of language in different contexts, and therefore, different 
possible ways of being in those contexts. Willig advises the analyst to ‘locate the various 
constructions of the object within wider discourses’ (2008, 115); she asks for attention to 
signiﬁcant words or phrases that seem to be relevant, or seem to indicate a wider dis- 
course. Willig leaves it open as to how a wider discourse should be recognised. 
This work is concerned with examination of meaning in context, rather than analy- 
sis of linguistic form and function from a more abstract perspective (Gee 2009). The 
current analysis drew upon Gee’s approach to critical discourse analysis in an 
explora- tion of intertextuality and ideology in the focus group texts, but only to the 
degree that it corresponded to the given research questions. Linguistic elements are 
combined with a broader thematic analysis which relies more heavily on social 
contexts. 
Undertaking such an analysis involved several stages: after gaining familiarity with 
the audio recordings, the transcripts were read and reread. Notes were made in the 
margins of the transcripts to identify points of interest and record initial thoughts. 
Each line of the texts was numbered. Time was taken to work gradually through the 
texts with attention to the ways in which language was used to construct meaning 
around dyslexia. Attention was given to the evolving narratives, to linguistic structure, 
and to the (interpreted) localised meaning of words and phrases. Careful notes were 
written in the margins. When this process was completed, the transcripts and notes 
were reread and the researcher reﬂected upon the links and contradictions between  
the different discourses. During this stage of analysis, several key themes were 
named. It is recognised that these themes were a product of the researcher’s interpret- 
ation of the text, and other analyses may have led to a different set of themes. 
 
Ethics 
This research was granted full ethical approval by a higher education institution in the 
North of England. 
 
Findings and discussion 
It is argued in this discussion that neoliberalist ideology is prevalent in the focus group 
discussions and that this ideology produces particular ways-of-being dyslexic in higher 
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education. The discussion is arranged according to three key themes: grades, effort and 
merit; self-blame and self-help; and equality versus fairness. The ﬁrst of these thematic 
sections includes extracts in which participants construct the existence of direct and 
unproblematic relationships between hard work, merit and success within the education 
system. Within this initial discussion attention is given to ideas of effort and success 
which are central to the construction of the ‘rugged individual’ in the American 
Dream (Rand 1957/1992; Greene 2008). The second thematic section questions the 
ways in which the participants and the researcher located educational success and 
failure within the individual, and drew upon common sense understandings to isolate 
individuals from their social contexts. Adoption of this group of ideologies via merito- 
cratic and individualist discourse had profound implications for identity construction in 
the given context, but also pointed towards particular behaviours and self-concepts 
which probably persisted beyond the focus group conversations. The ﬁnal themed 
section considers how the rhetoric of neoliberalism selectively draws upon democratic 
ideology, and discusses the ways in which the participants were situated precariously 
between such contradictory ‘ideals’ when they talked about  dyslexia. 
Key to transcription: 
[ ] – square brackets indicate overlapping speech 
, - comma indicates brief pause 
. – full stop indicates downward intonation and longer pause 
 
Effort and merit 
Below are two extracts, both dialogues between the researcher (H) and S. Both extracts 
arguably powerfully uphold the notion of the struggling, and succeeding individual. 
 
Extract from focus group one: S and H 
S: It was something I always felt, well, just deal with it. I mean I suppose it has inﬂu- 
enced me in that when I come to do work I sort of apply masses amounts of time, 
and I’ll read twice as, I’ll read ﬁve times as much as anyone else does and do ten 
times as much research. 
H: mmm. mmm. 
S: erm, so that might be overcompensating a bit in and that’s sort of my general 
mentality anyway? 
 
S is talking about how he experienced being dyslexic at school. He said elsewhere in the 
conversation that school teachers did not really take much notice of his dyslexia – and 
here S tells us how much effort he put into his work, and how he coped by himself. The 
line ‘… I always felt, well, just deal with it’ gives the impression of an internal 
voice, an inner ‘S’ who counselled the ‘outer’ S on how to be. S is then emphatic 
about the amount of effort he puts into his work as a way of dealing with the 
challenges of dys- lexia. The (likely) over-exaggeration in ‘I’ll read twice as, I’ll read 
ﬁve times as much 
… do ten times as much …’  is put to the task of positive identity construction. The use 
of ‘I’ll’ here is used to indicate a tendency or habit, something that is common-place for 
him. His construction of himself here ﬁts well with the idea of the ‘rugged individual’ 
(Greene 2008), a ‘moral’ individual, and someone who compares favourably to ‘anyone 
else’ in terms of effort put in. This hard-work ethic is part of his ‘general mentality’: a 
construction of an internal character trait which may be interpreted as admirable. In this 
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sense, S presents himself, intentionally or not, as the ideal worker, productive and 
uncomplaining. His speciﬁc statement of how much additional work he undertakes 
compared to others might be seen as an attempt to maintain his position as morally 
worthy in a landscape which condemns those who fall behind to ‘continuously teeter 
on the brink of moral regulation’ (Ball 2012, 20). It also presents his own success as 
separate from the community he is working within; others appear only present to  
help identify where in the competitive hierarchy he sits. This hard-working, uncom- 
plaining, getting-on-with-it self, the ideal self of neoliberalism, is also one who 
cannot both ask for help and maintain his favourable identity if he  remains within 
this ideological landscape. S repeatedly presents himself as a survivor who does not 
need any hand-outs. 
In the extract below, the researcher begins by asking the group how they feel about 
being ‘disabled’ according to British law. 
 
Extract from focus group one: H and S 
H:  … In in the law, dyslexia is a disability, so erm, according to them you are all 
disabled. I just wondered if you feel like you’re disabled or, or not. Or, if not, 
what does it, what does it actually mean? 
S: personally, no, but I’ve just always had to deal with it. It’s like having having a 
bad ham string, you’ve still got to run a race, [run] the race, regardlessly of 
H:                                                                           [mm] 
S: how badly he’s injured. Erm, but I can totally imagine that other people may feel 
disabled. 
The way S responds to the question is interesting because he uses the metaphor of the 
runner with a ‘bad ham string’ to support the argument that he is not disabled. This is 
surprising, in some ways, because one might expect the runner with a damaged ham 
string (in this analogy) to be an excellent example of a person who exactly is disabled, 
particularly in the context of a race. Arguably, this oddness or mismatch between the 
metaphor and the position it is being used to support is a reﬂection of the power of  
the individualising, survivalist ideology to overwhelm socially familiar constructions 
of (physical) disability. If S constructs himself as the injured runner, battling on 
through the ‘race’ to educational accomplishment,  he appears to be assuming the  
race is compulsory, and the only honourable way to proceed is without acknowledging 
his weakness, and without asking for any consideration of the unequal level at which he 
is participating. He ﬁnishes ‘I can totally imagine other people may feel disabled.’ In 
one stroke he elevates himself above the ‘others’ who are not as tough or resilient as 
him, or those who need to rely upon a ‘disability’ label. He constructs disability as a 
mere feeling and as something one can therefore decide to overcome with enough 
strength of character, and, crucially, he entrenches himself in this conversational turn 
so ﬁrmly within this particular ideological position that it takes a good number of con- 
versational turns for him to credibly position himself in any other way. From this pos- 
ition it is arguably impossible for S to say that accepting help is an honourable or 
socially admirable thing to do: making use of ‘reasonable adjustments’ is likewise 
incommensurate with the self as survivor. His ideological position also impacts upon 
the positions other participants can easily take up in subsequent turns because to say 
they needed help would be to construct themselves as morally inferior under this dis- 
cursive regime (Dudley-Marling 2004). This is an example of how assuming a particu- 
lar ideological stance can have hidden consequences – in this case, arguably, an 
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invisible self-discipline which places all eyes upon on the individual and absolves 
society of any responsibility. This perspective echoes the conclusions in the literature 
which suggest dyslexic students tend to take responsibility for their own difﬁculties, 
and put in additional effort in order to comply and ‘succeed’ (e.g. Riccick 2001; 
Gwernen-Jones 2012). 
 
Self-blame  and self-help 
S is by no means the only participant who draws upon discourses loyal to individualis- 
ing and meritocratic ideologies: this ideological backdrop was almost always there in 
the participants’ constructions of themselves, each other, and education. S’s identity  
as the struggling, uncomplaining survivor was mirrored again and again by others in 
each of the focus groups. For example, D said (focus group one [FG1]) that in the  
real world ‘my feeling is that you just need to compensate by being good at 
something else’, and later, D again, 
the reality is you just have to work harder, like, cos people can help you, give you Dicta- 
phones and stuff, give you all the help in the world, but in the end you’ve just got to sit 
down and work. 
 
And here is R later in FG1: ‘I don’t see it as a disability at all. I just see it as 
something that I need to know about, to compensate for … so it’s more for my 
understanding than for anyone else’s understanding’; and J, focus group two (FG2): 
‘you just live with it, you compensate, you just kind of ﬁnd little ways around doing 
things’. In these lines there appears to be a kind of echo in the phrasing used: ‘you 
just have to’, ‘you just need to’, ‘you’ve just got to’, ‘you just live with it’ in which 
the ‘just’ gives the impression that the action is simple and obvious and should be done 
without complaint, and the ‘you’ generalises the obligation to everyone who faces a 
similar challenge. The generalised advice via ‘you’ is often paired up with a 
personalised edge to the speaker’s perspective through, for example, ‘my feeling is’, 
‘for my understanding’, ‘personally’, ‘I just see it as’. The emphasis upon their 
opinions allows them to escape potential accusation of judging others for weakness, 
yet the use of generalising ‘you’ arguably implies that the speakers were constructing 
broader condemnation  of  those who ‘just’ could not deal with it. All of the 
participants are succeeding academically accord- ing to conventional understandings 
of academic achievement simply because they are students at an elite university; they 
are running S’s race despite their damaged ham- strings and can see the ﬁnish line – 
but there are people behind them, and people  who have dropped out of the race who, 
from a neoliberalist perspective, are not deser- ving of sympathy; they did not strive 
hard enough. ‘[T]hose who are strong in the face of adversity and who work hard will 
succeed’ says the American Dream (McGuinnis 2009, 62). In subscribing to 
meritocratic beliefs like this one, individuals are more likely to blame those who do 
not ‘succeed’ for their own failure, and to give greater respect to those who do 
‘succeed’ (see McCoy and Major 2007,  for a  summary of  the research in this area). 
Early in FG2 M implies that focusing upon the organic causes of dyslexia can allow 
dyslexic people to be distracted from their responsibility for their own success. Finding 
out what ‘causes’ dyslexia can make it easier for the ‘average’ dyslexic person to ‘not 
combat’ it; in other words, believing that dyslexia has a particular, internal cause can be 
used as an excuse not to work hard to overcome one’s own weaknesses, or as G says, 
to ‘deal with it, deal with  it’. 
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Extract from FG2: M, G, J and H 
M: Now obviously if you are a researcher of dyslexia, it’s very interesting to ﬁnd out 
what causes [it, but for the] average dyslexic person. 
H:                         [so what is ] 
M: but it can be useful for the average dyslexic person because it makes it much easier 
to not combat it, cos, that sounds really aggressive, but if you know how to combat 
[something, to] makes it [easier to ] 
J: [to build        ] 
M: but if someone could say to me 
G: deal with it, deal with it. 
M and G together here construct what might be interpreted as a damning judgement 
upon people who refer to their disability in order to argue for reasonable adjustments 
and a fair playing ﬁeld, people for whom an organic ‘cause’ might be crucial. In M’s 
discourse, the individual is ultimately accountable for their own success, and is to be 
blamed for their own failure. ‘The assumptions of the ideology are that of the 
individual as an autonomous self, while education is seen as neutral’ (McGinnis 2009, 
62); and the institution is absolved of any responsibility. 
Instead of encouraging a sense of support and connectedness within the student 
community, individualising and meritocratic ideologies help to create isolated, com- 
petitive individuals who measure their own success through narrow comparison with 
others (i.e. according to educational institution, level and grade). This encourages 
overt criticism of peers and creates an atmosphere of judgement and condescension 
which leaves little room for collaboration and cooperation. Some of the participants 
found themselves straddling a rigid, dominant individualism and another ideological 
position which said, in essence, ‘it’s not fair’. There was at once an impression that   
all obstacles should be individually overcome without fuss, and the contradictory 
sense that the educational context was leaving them severely and unacceptably 
disadvantaged. 
 
Equality  versus fairness 
The construction of the self in comparison and in competition with others is a strong 
theme throughout the focus group conversations. This group of  constructions  
appears to straddle the idea that things should be ‘fair’, and the idea that ‘it’s all    
about hard-work, so stop complaining’. Nowhere is the ﬁne balance between egalitar- 
ian, democratic, meritocratic, individualistic, and neoliberal ideologies more apparent 
(in these focus groups) than when participants were discussing the use, or not, or the 
fairness, or not, of ‘reasonable adjustments’. ‘Reasonable adjustments’ is the term  
used to refer to institutions’ legal obligation to try to create a level playing ﬁeld for par- 
ticipation; that is, it is required that the university put in place adjustments in 
assessment and teaching, for example, to reduce the disadvantage minority groups 
experience during their studies. Dyslexic students are legally ‘disabled’ and they 
therefore have the right to adjustments like extra time in exams,  considerate  
marking, a specialist dyslexia tutor, a computer and assistive software, lecture notes 
before the lecture, and sometimes a proof-reader, scribe or mentor, among other 
things. In both focus group conversations the use of such adjustments is a topic for 
heated discussion. 
Below is a discussion of the ideological presence in example extracts in which the 
participants construct the use of adjustments as negative, unfair or dishonourable. First, 
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here is R in the second focus group, responding to a request for clariﬁcation about his 
position on reasonable adjustments: 
 
Extract from FG2: H, R and M 
H: OK, I’ll ramble on till then [then] but you were saying that you didn’t want 
M:                                              [yeah] 
H: anyone to make any adjustments for you. Is that right? 
R: yeah. I consider a degree a bit like becoming a medical doctor. If you’re, if you 
don’t have that standard, I don’t see how I should qualify. 
H: ok. 
First of all, ‘becoming a medical doctor’ is upheld as the ultimate in academic and 
moral achievement (still popularly understood as an occupation of the elites, see 
Mathers and Parry 2009), and a standard against which other achievements may be 
measured. The assumption is that one cannot become a doctor without a good deal    
of individual merit. Furthermore, a ‘standard’ is something that you ‘have’; that is, 
either it is contained within you, or it is not, and tough luck if it is not. The standard 
you are set at is understood to be fair and accurate, and conveniently allows comparison 
between individuals. This may seem democratic, but, argue Carr and Hartnett (1996) is 
an ‘elitist conception of democracy’ (171) and one which only imitates egalitarianism. 
Having a degree is lifted to a similar intellectual and moral status to becoming a medical 
doctor; it is a symbol of worth that would be tainted if people were to come by such an 
accolade without the correct ‘standard’. My interpretation of R’s position here is that 
making ‘adjustments’ would lead to just such a  taint. 
Below is which begins with R talking about the value of rote learning, and continues 
with J and M afﬁrming his ideological position. It is an important extract to include 
because it illustrates how ideological assumptions can have implications for identity 
and action. 
 
Extract from FG2: R, J and M 
R: look, I think, [it’s not easy] and it’s not easy for dyslexics, but I 
think J:                       [hhhhh ] 
R: rote-learning does have a place in this in this education that we’re doing now. I 
think it’s just a reality that we ﬁnd  hard. 
J: I think, cos I wouldn’t want to get a ﬁrst, and know that it was because I had dys- 
lexia, when I [get that] I want to know that it’s because I’ve done it 
M:                           [mmm ] 
J: and to the same, to like their standard 
M: mmm 
J: and so like, I agree. [with what  you’resaying] 
M:                                   [mmmm you want your ] 
J: [yeah you’ve got a degree and you’re dyslexic                        ] or 
M: [ﬁrst to be the same as this person’s ﬁrst or that person’s ﬁrst ] 
J: you got it [cos] you’re dyslexic, you wanna know that you 
M:                [mm] 
M: mmm 
J: achieved it the same [as] 
The phrase R uses – ‘I think, it’s not easy for dyslexics, but …’ might give the 
impression of sympathy, but in fact works to set up the idea that dyslexic students 
should nonetheless get on and cope. And R’s introductory ‘look’ constructs his talk 
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as being frank, honest and straight to the point, and therefore difﬁcult to resist. R does 
not say that all learning should be rote learning; he says it has ‘a place’– once again this 
is hard to resist because it would be fairly extreme to argue that all rote learning should 
be outlawed. He then presents rote learning as a ‘reality’ of university education. 
Rote learning in educational institutions, argue Carr and Hartnett, was about 
efﬁciency in a market-driven system (1996). Under this market hegemony, there was a 
move towards knowledge transmission over inquiry-based learning (Carr and Hartnett 
1996), a move which gave pride of place to memorisation and learning by rote. 
Moreover, it is common sense that what is ‘reality’ cannot be changed; so for R, 
there is no alternative but to ﬁt in with the system as best as you can. If R did not have 
the dyslexia label, his comment here (in a group of people with the label) might have 
produced a retort such as ‘what would you know?’, but as he is dyslexic, R’s position 
is beyond easy criticism. It is interesting that J and M respond immediately with a 
similar stance to R. J says: 
 
I think, cos I wouldn’t want to get a ﬁrst, and know that it was because I had dyslexia, 
when I get that I want to know that it’s because I’ve done it … and to the same, to like 
their standard. 
 
From this perspective, reasonable adjustments are considered a threat to the independent 
success of the dyslexic student and a risk to the worth of their degree. They are also con- 
structed as fundamentally unfair, in line with an understanding that in a ‘democracy’ 
everyone should be treated equally (which obviously ignores the fact that ‘equal’ may 
not mean ‘fair’). This version of democracy again ﬁts with Carr and Hartnett’s idea of 
‘elitist’ democracy (1996); one in which it beneﬁts the most privileged in a society to 
uphold the idea of fair treatment for all, as long as this ignores the disparity in individuals’ 
circumstances and degree of social and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1991). It is also worth 
noting here the language of ‘getting’ or ‘having’ a degree, the idea of a degree as 
some- thing you possess, and this possession as more valuable than the learning 
process; ‘stu- dents seek to “have a degree” rather than “be learners”’ (Molesworth, 
Nixon, and Scullion 2009, 277; see also Ainley and Weyers 2008). 
Although some participants maintained their ideological stance on reasonable adjust- 
ments relatively consistently throughout the conversations, individual participants 
appeared to be torn upon the issue. Here is C half way through extract 35, talking  
about how she felt about the ‘free stuff’ she received after being identiﬁed as dyslexic. 
 
 
Extract from FG1: C, S and H 
C:  … well, when I was diagnosed, I got all this equipment through and  people were 
like that’s ridicu[lous ] like [hh ] why do you get a 
S:                             [mmm] [mmm] 
C: printer just cos you’re dyslexic? But it has really helped to like, print out your 
lecture notes, when you go to the lecture and that, so, [but ] you do feel 
S:                                                                                          [mmm] 
C: a bit unfair because I am getting all this stuff for free. But then I guess you do need 
it, but then I have managed without it, before. 
H: yeah. 
C: so. I don’t know, but. I’m like, well, I’m entitled to it, so I’ll have 
it. H: yeah. 
C: so 
H: yeah 
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In the extract above C tries to manage the connected ideals of fairness and merit, and 
struggles to reach a conclusion about what these ideals mean for her behaviour. C 
begins by referring to the response of other people: ‘they were like, that’s  ridiculous 
like why do you get a printer  just cos you’re dyslexic?’ and so she is under  pressure  
to justify the equipment she was given. ‘[I]t has really helped’ says C ‘but you do feel  
a bit unfair’; ‘But then I do need it, but then I have managed without it before’. C 
repeat- edly switches between constructions of entitlement and guilt. This uncomfortable 
switch- ing is arguably reﬂective the tensions between egalitarian-democratic and 
meritocratic ideological positions. The former allows C to justify her adjustments on 
the grounds that she has a greater need than others, while the latter condemns any 
means of getting ahead which does not come from an individual’s merit or hard work. 
British Law on ‘equality’ here is in danger of being eclipsed by the unwritten laws of 
meritocracy and capitalism. This feeling of discomfort about making use of 
adjustments and preferring to manage alone is reported elsewhere in the literature (e.g. 
Mortimore 2012). 
 
Conclusions 
In these focus groups, the common sense understanding that success is based upon 
merit and hard work frequently shut down other ways of constructing achievement 
and fairness in education. On a number of occasions students in this study found them- 
selves uncomfortably stuck between democratic, social justice, and meritocratic ideals, 
and with tension, swung between different social identities which were only acceptable 
if the conversation were blowing in a particular ideological direction. Moreover, con- 
structions of identity, learning and ability were very readily formed from an individua- 
listic ideological perspective; that is, the individualistic and neoliberal versions of 
students and education and equality appeared to be the default in these conversations. 
To resist these constructions involved discursive effort and sometimes meant social dis- 
comfort and/ or isolation for the participant introducing such resistance. 
Part of the power of ideological hegemony at work here is to produce people who 
cannot see beyond the common sense structures which they draw upon uncritically in 
their meaning making (Apple 2004, 6). Not only can people not see beyond these struc- 
tures, but arguably actively reproduce them. In such reproduction, symbols like grades 
become desirable; according to Deleuze and Guatari, the desire for hierarchical markers 
is a way of repressing other desires (for freedom, self-determination) which threaten the 
social structure as is: ‘repression, hierarchy, exploitation, and servitude are 
themselves desired’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2013, 139). Furthermore, the very thing 
which might arm students against such self-repression, namely, the ability to think 
critically and   to question self-evident ‘truths’, is arguably itself dulled by the 
practices of the neolib- eral university (Molesworth, Nixon, and Scullion 2009). 
In the introduction to this paper, attention was given to the controversies within the 
ﬁeld of dyslexia research and practice, and particularly to Elliott and Grigorenko’s 
(2014) arguments that dyslexia is no longer a useful term in most research and edu- 
cational contexts. What the current research adds to this argument does not come in 
the form of an endorsement or a rally against such a position. What it does argue is 
that no matter what labels we attach to learners in education, no matter how noble   
the intention, these labels do not stand still. They are pushed into a world of competing 
discursive constructions and ideological ‘common sense’ which fragment and hijack 
intended meanings. Even with a robust and exacting scientiﬁc deﬁnition, dyslexia (or 
a  replacement  term)  would  still  collect  socially  determined  and  context-bound 
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meanings (Danermark 2002). Moreover, many of the socially constructed and most dis- 
abling aspects of dyslexia would remain, despite a change in deﬁnition. For example, 
those discourses which connect traditional educational achievement and high literacy to 
‘intellect’ would remain (Macdonald 2009). As such, any decision to end its use in 
edu- cation and education should not come from one discursive ﬁeld alone. 
Psychology helps us to understand the cognitive dimensions of dyslexia; but it is 
lacking in the tools to explore the how and why and what of its social and political 
construction.  The position in this paper is that we need to think about what a change 
in labelling might mean for people (Riddick 2010); how it might impact upon already 
threatened attempts to equalise the playing ﬁeld in western education systems; and 
why, when we look back through a history littered with discarded labels, do we 
consider that it  at this moment science has discovered the correct answer. 
To reiterate, then, developing tools to resist potential devaluation of the achieve- 
ments and participation of students with learning differences is an important part of 
the ﬁght for fairness within the higher education system. Explicitly encouraging stu- 
dents and educators to recognise the ideological voice in everyday conversation is 
essential for such a critical education and for a fairer education system. In other 
words, better understanding of the discourses surrounding dyslexia and of the ideologi- 
cal threads which speak through us when we speak will arguably assist students and 
teachers in higher education to critically reﬂect upon the learning identities they take 
on, or are given. Challenge is only possible if people recognise that they have a 
degree of choice in the identities they associate with, that the self is constructed 
‘inside-out’ as well  as ‘outside-in’ (Bruner 1990, 108). 
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